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PRO-CHOICE TAXATION: CONSISTENT TAX
TREATMENT OF STOCK REDEMPTIONS AT DIVORCE
Richard E. Fogg
Abstract: The Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court have disagreed on the circumstances in
which nonrecognition of gain under § 1041 of the Internal Revenue Code may extend to a
spouse who redeems stock at divorce. This conflict is representative of a larger problem
surrounding the question of which spouse to tax on the redemption of stock incident to
divorce. This Comment examines the tension between the policy underlying § 1041 and the
temporary regulations, and identifies the tension as the cause of inconsistent judicial
decisions. This Comment also proposes an amendment to the Code that provides both
certainty to the divorcing spouses and ensures that gain is recognized by one spouse.

Section 1041 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that no gain is
recognized on the transfer of property between spouses or former
spouses incident to divorce.' Gain is deferred through a carryover basis,
until property is transferred to a third party. Temporary regulations under
§ 1041 extend nonrecognition to transfers to third parties in limited
circumstances where a spouse transfers property to a third party "on
behalf of" the nontransferring spouse.2 These regulations are the focal
point for confusion where, incident to divorce, a closely held corporation
redeems the stock of one or both of the spouses.
By inconsistently applying the regulations to the taxation of stock
redemptions, the courts have frustrated the policy underlying § 1041 and
created room for divorcing spouses to maneuver against one another and
against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This has resulted in spouses
litigating the issue of who should be taxed, even where one had first
assumed the tax burden. Additionally, the unpredictable judicial
application of the regulations often has forced divorcing spouses to face
the inconvenience and expense of obtaining private letter rulings from
the IRS. Ultimately, this maneuvering room has expanded to where in
one instance, neither spouse was taxed on the redemption of stock.3
This Comment examines the relationship between the regulations
under § 1041, the underlying policy of deferral embodied in § 1041, and
the inconsistent judicial decisions. It concludes by proposing an
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code that would ensure that spouses
1. I.R.C. § 1041(a) (1988).
2. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c), Q & A 9 (1984).
3. Ames v. United States, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992); Ames v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 522
(1994).
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treat the redemption of stock at divorce consistently. Part I describes the
background to nonrecognition under § 1041. Part II explains how stock
redemptions incident to divorce fit within the framework of § 1041 and
its corresponding regulations. This part also outlines how the courts have
inconsistently decided the cases. Part III analyzes the aftermath of the
judicial decisions. Part IV outlines the current position of the IRS and
contends that its position neither clears the confusion of the cases, nor is
consistent with the policy of § 1041. Part V argues for an amendment to
section 302 of the Internal Revenue Code that would resolve the
confusion and provide spouses freedom to choose who will recognize
gain on a stock redemption contemplated by a divorce agreement.
I.

PROPERTY TRANSFERS BETWEEN DIVORCING SPOUSES:
BACKGROUND OF I.R.C. § 1041

Whenever property is sold or otherwise disposed of, the seller must
recognize any realized gain unless a specific nonrecognition provision in
the Code applies.4 Section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code states that
gain from the sale or other disposition of property is the amount realized
from the sale over the property's adjusted basis.5 This realized gain is
recognized (taxed) except as otherwise provided in the Code.6 A
taxpayer's adjusted basis in property is generally the amount it cost.7
There are a number of nonrecognition provisions in the Internal
Revenue Code.' Based on a variety of policies, Congress has enacted
these provisions to allow taxpayers to defer gain recognition. With rare
exception,9 a mechanism exists in each of these sections to ensure that
deferred realized gain will be recognized on a subsequent taxable
transaction. 0 Among the deferral mechanisms is the carryover basis

4. LR.C. § 1001(c) (1988).
5. LR.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
6. I.R.C. § 1001(c).
7. I.R.C. § 1012 (1988).
8. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031 (1988) (providing nonrecognition of gain on exchanges of property of
"like-kind").
9. The basis of property acquired by a decedent is given a fair market value basis at the time of the
decedent's death. I.R.C. § 1014 (1988). Thus, if the person who receives the property from the
decedent sells it immediately, none of the gain that may have been recogni:ed by the decedent on a
sale will ever be realized on the property.
10. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031(d) (1988).
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requirement where the property's basis literally carries over from the
transferor to the transferee."
A.

PropertyTransfersBetween Spouses

Although the Code provides that the sale or disposition of property
ordinarily would require gain recognition, the question of whether one
spouse had to recognize gain on the transfer of appreciated property to
the other was unresolved for years. Much of the confusion on this issue
stemmed from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Davis.'2 In that case, Davis transferred appreciated property to his wife
incident to divorce; the Commissioner treated the transfer as a tax
recognition event for him. 3 The Court noted that while the division of
jointly owned property may not have been a recognition event, the
transfer of property pursuant to divorce was. 4 Subsequent cases and
rulings held
that the mere division of jointly owned property is not
5
taxable.
This holding led to maneuvering by practitioners and state
legislatures, who tried to make property settlements appear as much like
divisions of property interests as possible. 16 The Davis holding also
created the possibility that neither spouse would recognize any gain. This
would happen if the transferor treated the exchange as a nonrecognition
event, while the transferee, believing that the transferor recognized gain,
took a fair market value basis in the property. 7 This problem of
taxpayers avoiding gain recognition without a nonrecognition provision
is known as the whipsaw. 18

11. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1041(b) (1988). Suppose B transfers property to A in an exchange that
qualifies for nonrecognition under some provision of the Internal Revenue Code. Suppose that A is
required to take a carryover basis from B. IfB had an adjusted basis of 10 in the property worth 50, A
must take an adjusted basis of 10 in the property, even if the property cost A 50. Most
nonrecognition provisions have no effect on who pays tax, only on when tax is paid. Section 1041,
however, affects both the person paying and the timing of tax.

12. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
13. Id. at 66.
14. Id. at69.
15. See Alan L. Feld, Divorce and Redemption, 64 Tax Notes 651 (Aug. 1, 1994).
16. Id. By giving courts discretion over the technical form of property settlement agreements,
state legislatures could provide that individually held property could be "divided between owners"
instead of transferred. Id.
17. Id. at 652.
18. See, e.g., Ames v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 522, 541-42 (1994) (Beghe, J., concurring).
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In 1984, the posturing ended when Congress enacted I.R.C. § 1041,
which rejected the holding in Davis by providing that no gain is
recognized on a transfer between spouses.' 9 Gain will not be recognized
on a transfer of property to a former spouse where the transfer was
"incident to divorce."2 A transfer is incident to divorce when it occurs
within one year of the cessation of the marriage, or waen it is related to
the cessation of the marriage.2 To alleviate the possibility of the
whipsaw, Congress further provided that the transferee spouse takes a
carryover basis in the property.'
B.

Policy ofDeferral

Section 1041 embodies a policy of deferring gain until a recognition
event occurs subsequent to an interspousal transfer of property. The
carryover basis preserves any gain, which is recognized when the
transferee spouse ultimately disposes of the property to a third party. The
policy of deferral is intended to provide spouses with certainty over who
will recognize the gain on appreciated marital propeity.' This ensures
flexibility over the division of assets at divorce.
II.

STOCK REDEMPTIONS INCIDENT TO DIVO:RCE

A.

Redemption as Third-PartyTransfer

Nonrecognition of gain under I.R.C. § 1041 generally is limited to
transfers of property between spouses or former spouses incident to
divorce. In most circumstances, transfers to third parties will result in
recognition of gain. A redemption of stock is a transfer of property to a
19. § 1041(a).
20. Id.

21. I.R.C. § 1041(c) (1988).
22. I.RC. § 1041(b) (1988).
23. The House Committee report states:
The Committee believes that, in general, it is inappropriate to tax transfers between
spouses....
The current rules governing transfers of property between spouses or farmer spouses incident
to divorce have not worked well and have led to much controversy and litigation. Often the rules
have proved a trap for the unwary as, for example, where the parties view property acquired
during marriage (even though held in one spouse's name) as jointly owned, only to find that the
equal division of the property on divorce triggers recognition of gain.
Furthermore, in divorce cases, the Government often gets whipsawed.
H.R. Rep. No. 432,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191-92 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1134-35.
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third-party (or more exactly, a third-party corporation). So long as stock
is held by one or both spouses, no gain will be recognized under § 1041.
Often a divorcing couple's most valuable asset is the stock of a closely
held corporation. To ensure a fair division of property at divorce, it is
often necessary to withdraw some portion of the equity in the
corporation. A third-party transfer accordingly is required to effectuate
this withdrawal. There are a few ways in which the division of corporate
assets may be accomplished. First, one spouse may transfer stock to the
transferee spouse, and the transferee would then cause the corporation to
redeem the stock for assets (Case 1).24 Second, the spouses may divide
jointly owned stock, with one spouse redeeming the resulting interest
(Case 2).z Third, one spouse may retain exclusive stock ownership and
agree to reimburse the other for the value of a certain interest in the
stock; thereafter, the remaining shareholder spouse may or may not cause
the corporation to discharge the obligation (Case 3).26
In Cases 1 and 2 set out above, both spouses agree on the manner in
which corporate assets will be used to divide marital property interests.
There is a property transfer of some sort between the spouses, followed
by a transfer to the third-party corporation. In Case 3, however, there is
no transfer of stock between the spouses. Instead, the remaining
shareholder discharges an obligation by using assets of the corporation.
B.

TemporaryRegulation 1.1041-JT(c) Q&A 9

As set out above, nonrecognition under § 1041 is not applied to
transfers of property to third parties. In limited situations, however,
§ 1041 has been extended to certain third-party transfers by regulation.'
In 1984, the Treasury Department issued temporary regulations under
§ 1041 in a question and answer format. One of these, "Q & A 9,"
provides that under § 1041 a spouse who transfers property to a third
party "on behalf of" the nontransferring spouse will not recognize gain.28
The regulations describe three instances in which a transfer will be
"on behalf of" the nontransferring spouse. The first is where the transfer

24. E.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-27-009 (July 8, 1994).
25. E.g., Ames v. United States, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992).
26. E.g., Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993).
27. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(c), Q & A 9 (1984).
28. Id.
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is "required by a divorce or separation agreement. 2 9 The regulations
provide that where a transfer is "on behalf of" the nontransferring
spouse, it will be treated as made directly to the nontransferring spouse.
No gain is recognized by the transferring spouse on this deemed transfer
under § 1041. Thereafter, the nontransferring spouse is treated as
immediately transferring the property to the third party in a transaction
that does not qualify under § 1041. This process ensures that one, but
only one, spouse will recognize gain from the transaction.30
C.

JudicialApplication of "On Behalf Of" Test to Stock Redemptions
at Divorce

The "on behalf of" language in Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c),
Q & A 9 has caused inconsistent outcomes in the recognition of gain on
stock redemptions incident to divorce. As stated above, it is often
necessary for a divorcing couple to withdraw the assets of a closely held
corporation to effect an equitable division of marital property interests.
This is generally done through a transfer of stock from one spouse to the
third-party corporation in exchange for assets.
In applying the "on behalf of" language in the temporary regulation to
such third-party redemptions at divorce, courts have struggled to define
the circumstances under which a spouse redeeming stock will not
recognize gain under § 1041. More precisely, the issue is whether a
redemption of stock can be "on behalf of" the nonredeeming spouse3"
within the meaning of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(c), Q & A 9.

29. Id. The two other instances detailel in the regulations are not relevant for the present
discussion. They are "where the transfer to the third party is pursuant to the written request of the
other spouse (or former spouse)" and "where the transferor receives from the other spouse (or former
spouse) a written consent or ratification of the transfer to the third party." Id.
30. It is feasible that both spouses could recognize gain if the transferring spouse recognizes
capital gain from the redemption of stock, and the nontransferring spouse is held to have had a
constructive dividend if the redemption discharges a primary and unconditional obligation.
31. In this instance, the "nonredeeming spouse" is the same as the "nontransferring spouse," as
used in part ILB. Both terms refer to the individual who has not actually caused his or her own
property (stock in a closely held corporation) to be transferred outside of tie spousal unit. Because
this discussion is focused on the redemption of stock, "nonredeeming spouse" and "redeeming
spouse" will be used in place of "transferring spouse" and "nontransferring spouse." These terms
will be used only to refer to the third-party transfer and not to actualtransfeis between spouses.
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1.

The Ames Cases

The case of John and Joann Ames represents the conflicting judicial
application of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(c). To bring about a fair
property settlement at divorce, the Arneses redeemed the appreciated
stock of a corporation in which they were the sole shareholders. However
the Arneses whipsawed the IRS by convincing different courts that
neither should be taxed on the redemption.32
John and Joann Ames jointly held all of the stock of Moriah
Corporation (Moriah).33 Through Moriah, they operated a McDonald's
franchise in Washington state. When the couple entered divorce
proceedings, McDonald's notified them that only one spouse could retain
equity ownership in the corporation to keep the franchise.34 The spouses
agreed to divide their joint interest in the stock, and have Moriah redeem
Joann's 50%. 35 Moriah redeemed Joann's stock for $450,000 of
consideration, including debt forgiveness, cash, and Moriah's note, on
which John was secondarily liable. This agreement was incorporated into
the divorce decree.36
a.

Ames v. United States (JoannAmes)

Joann initially reported capital gain from the redemption but later sued
for a refund in federal district court. The district court found in Joann's
favor, holding the redemption of her stock was "on behalf of" John
within the meaning of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c), Q & A 9.37 The
court reasoned that a transfer to a third party (here Moriah) would be "on
behalf of" the nontransferring spouse when that spouse received any
benefit. The court found that John received the benefit of having all
future community property claims relieved by the redemption.38
The IRS appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
rejected the "any benefit" test used by the district court, but still found in

32. Ames v. United States, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992); Ames v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 522
(1994).
33. Ames v. United States, 981 F.2d at 457.
34. Id.
35. The form used by the Amneses models Case 2 redemptions. See suprapart ll.A.
36. Arnes, 981 F.2d at 457.
37. Ames v. United States, No. C90-728C, 1991 WL 82830 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 1991), af/d on
othergrounds, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992).
38. Id.

1077

Washington Law Review

Vol. 70:1071, 1995

favor of Joann. 3 9 The court held that the transfer would be "on behalf of"
the nontransferring spouse if the nontransferring spouse had an
obligation that was relieved by the transfer.4" The court reasoned that
John was obligated to see the terms of the divorce decree through and
that he was secondarily liable on the corporate note.4
b.

Ames v. Commissioner (JohnAmes)

While Ames v. United States was pending, the IRS asserted a
deficiency against John Ames, who then sued in the Tax Court.42 The
IRS argued that John had received a constructive dividend from Moriah
and that, if the stock redemption were held to be a transfer to which
§ 1041 applies, John would automatically be liable for the tax burden.
The IRS caused the court to delay the decision in John's case until the
Ninth Circuit decided Joann's case.43
The Tax Court held that John Ames could be liable for tax only if he
had received a constructive dividend from Moriah on the stock
redemption. Determining that the stock redemption did not discharge a
"primary and unconditional obligation" of John Ames, the Tax Court
held that he received no constructive dividend.4 5 As a result, neither
spouse was taxed on the withdrawal of corporate funds.
2.

Blatt v. Commissioner

In a case arising in the Sixth Circuit, with facts similar to the Ames
cases, the Tax Court held that the "on behalf of" language of Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c), Q & A 9 did not shift gain recognition to the
nontransferring spouse. 46 Gloria Blatt and her husband each owned stock
representing 50% of the ownership of Phyllograph Corporation (the
Corporation).4 7 Incident to the divorce decree, the Corporation redeemed
39. Amnes, 981 F.2d at 459-60.
40. Id.
41. The court also noted that under state law, if the corporation defaulted, Joann could sue John
without seeking any recourse against the corporation. Id.
42. Ames v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 522 (1994).
43. Id. at 526.
44. This is the long-accepted standard for constructive dividends as adop ted in Rev. Rul. 69-608,
1969-2 C.B. 42.
45. Arnes, 102 T.C. at 530.
46. Blatt v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 77 (1994).
47. Id. at 78.
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Gloria Blatt's stock for consideration of $45,384.4 Mrs. Blatt did not
recognize any gain on the transaction and the Commissioner claimed a
deficiency.49 Mrs. Blatt sued in the Tax Court.
A majority of the court stated that the issue was whether the
redemption of Mrs. Blatt's stock by the Corporation was "on behalf of"
her husband within the meaning of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-lT(c) °
It reasoned that a transfer of property by one spouse is "on behalf of" the
nontransferring spouse in the limited situation where: (1) the
nontransferring spouse owes a debt or is obligated to a third party, and
(2) the other spouse transfers property to discharge (in whole or in part)
the nontransferring spouse's obligation." Without giving specific
reasons, the court held that the stock redemption was not "on behalf of"
Mr. Blatt as he did not have an obligation to the third-party corporation. 2
The Tax Court majority explicitly
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
53
decision in Ames v. UnitedStates.
Judge Halpern, in a concurring opinion, argued that the majority failed
to clearly articulate its reasons for disagreeing with Ames v. United
States and gave no indication as to how it would decide if confronted
with Ames-type facts. 4 Thus, in at least Judge Halpem's opinion, the
issue of when or whether a stock redemption is "on behalf of" the
nontransferring spouse was not settled by the Blatt majority.
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Beghe outlined yet another
interpretation of the "on behalf of" language in the temporary regulation.
In Judge Beghe's opinion, a stock redemption would not be "on behalf
of" the nontransferring spouse unless it discharges the nontransferring
spouse's "primary and unconditional obligation" to purchase the stock.
There were a total of five opinions5 6 issued in Blatt, indicating that
even after Blatt, the application of the "on behalf of" language in the
temporary regulations to a stock redemption at divorce is hardly a settled
48. Id.
49. Id.

50. Id. at 80-81.
51. Id. at 81.
52. Id. at 82.
53. "[We do not agree with Ames and respectfully refuse to follow it." Id. The court found the
fact that John Ames was secondarily liable on the corporate note and that McDonald's required sole
ownership of the corporation by one spouse to be distinguishable facts. Id. at 82-83.
54. Id. at 84 (Halpem, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 85 (Beghe, J., concurring).
56. The majority opinion was issued by Judge Laro, Judge Cheichi issued a concurring opinion in
addition to Judges Halpemn and Beghe, and Judge Parr dissented.
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matter. What is clear after the decision, however, is he existence of a
conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court sitting in the Sixth
Circuit.
Hayes v. Commissioner

3.

Both the Ames and Blatt stock redemption; were Case 2
redemptions," where stock is owned by both spouses, one of whom
redeems stock incident to a divorce agreement. A Case 3 fact pattern58
reached the Tax Court in the consolidated case of Mary Ruth and Jimmy
Hayes.59 Mr. and Mrs. Hayes were the sole shareholders of JRE
Corporation (JRE) through which they operated a McDonald's
franchise.' Jimmy Hayes owned a majority of the stock of JRE, and
Mary Ruth Hayes owned the remainder. 6' As with the Arneses,
McDonald's required that only one spouse have sole ownership of JRE
after the divorce.62
Unlike the Ames cases, the Hayeses entered into a separation
agreement which obligated Mr. Hayes to purchase Mr-s. Hayes's shares
for $128,000.63 After the separation agreement was incorporated into the
divorce decree, Mr. Hayes's attorney proposed to have Mrs. Hayes
redeem her shares to JRE instead of having Mr. Hayes buy them. 6 The
reasons given for this change were Mr. Hayes's lack of cash, and the
expectation that the resulting tax to Mrs. Hayes would be lower than if
Mr. Hayes withdrew money from JRE to buy the stock.65
Thereafter, JRE redeemed Mrs. Hayes's stock, and the divorce court
entered a nunc pro tunc order "correcting" the divorce decree to include
a provision requiring JRE to redeem Mrs. Hayes's shares.66 Neither
spouse reported any gain from the transaction, and the Commissioner

57. See supra part II.A. (Joint ownership of stock is dissolved; one spouse redeems his or her
resulting interest).
58. See supra part II.A. (One spouse retains ownership of stock, agreeing to compensate the other,
corporation discharges that obligation).
59. Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993).
60. Id. at 595.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 596.
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determined deficiencies against both. 7 The cases went to the Tax Court
and were consolidated to prevent the possibility of the whipsaw. The IRS
agreed that if the court found one spouse responsible for the recognition
of gain on the redemption, it would drop its claim against the other. 68
The court was faced once more with the issue of whether a stock
redemption by a divorcing spouse was made "on behalf of" the
nonredeeming spouse within the meaning of Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1041-IT(c), Q & A 9. In the consolidated case, the Commissioner
chose to argue that the redemption of Mrs. Hayes's shares was "on
behalf of" Jimmy Hayes. The court dismissed the validity of the nunc
pro tunc order69 and framed the dispositive question as whether Mr.
Hayes had a "primary and unconditional obligation" to buy Mrs. Hayes's
shares.7" If Mr. Hayes had such an obligation, according to the court, the
use of JRE's assets to discharge the obligation was a constructive
dividend to him.7" Further, the stock redemption by Mrs. Hayes would be
a transfer of property "on behalf of" Mr. Hayes, and she would not
recognize gain by virtue of § 1041.72
The court so held, adding that the obligation of Mr. Hayes continued
until the time that JRE redeemed Mrs. Hayes's shares. Accordingly, the
court held that Mr. Hayes received a taxable constructive dividend.'
Thus, the Commissioner conceded that as to Mrs. Hayes, the redemption
was a transfer of property for which no gain was recognized pursuant to
§ 1041. 74
The negative implication of the Commissioner's concession is that
where a nontransferring spouse has a "primary and unconditional
obligation" to buy the shares of the other spouse which is discharged by
the corporation, the transfer of stock will be "on behalf of" the
nontransferring spouse. 7' This may be the outcome where, as in Hayes,
both cases are consolidated in front of one court. However, even the
Hayes court recognized the remaining possibility of extending Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c) to stock redemptions where there is no
67. Id. at 597.
68. Id. at 606.
69. Id. at 603.
70. Id. at 598-99.
71. Id. at 599.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 605.
74. Id. at 606.
75. See Blatt v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 77, 85 (1994) (Beghe, J., concurring).
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constructive dividend. 76 Thus, there is still room for the spouses in a Case
3 redemption to whipsaw the IRS if the obligation of fie nontransferring
spouse is not "primary and unconditional," or if the cases are not
consolidated.
Summary ofDecisions

4.

The conflicting decisions of the courts in these cases have left
divorcing spouses little certainty. The courts have focused on whether a
transfer of stock from a divorcing spouse to the third-party corporation is
"on behalf of" the nontransferring spouse. As Blate; Hayes, and the
Ames cases illustrate, courts have disagreed on the app:ropriate resolution
of this issue.
Courts have used at least four different tests to determine when a
transfer by a transferring spouse will be "on behalf of" the
nontransferring spouse: (1) whether the nontransferring spouse receives
any benefit from the transfer;77 (2) whether the nontransferring spouse
had an obligation that was relieved by the transfer of stock to the
corporation;78 (3) whether the nontransferring spouse has an obligation to
transfer property to a third party that is discharged by the transfer of
property to the third party by the transferring spouse;-9 and (4) whether
the nontransferring spouse has a "primary and unconditional obligation"
to buy the property of the transferring spouse, and causes the obligation
to be discharged by the third-party corporation."a
Thus, the answer to the question of which spouse should be taxed on a
stock redemption incident to divorce currently depends on which of these
tests a court elects to apply. The possibility of the whipsaw (as seen in
the Ames cases) arises when the parties bring their cases in different
venues and different tests are applied to each spouse. That is to say, a
single stock redemption may be said to be "on behalf of" the
nontransferring spouse under one test, but not under anDther.

76. "Even if we were not to agree with respondent that Mr. Hayes should bear the tax associated
with the transaction at issue here, a question may still arise as to whether sec. 1041 would in any
event protect Ms. Hayes from recognizing a long-term capital gain on the disposition of her stock."
Hayes, 101 T.C. at 598 n.3.
77. Ames v. United States, No. C90-728C, 1991 WL 82830 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 1991), affid on
othergrounds, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992).
78. Ames v. United States, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992).
79. Blatt, 102 T.C. 77.
80. Hayes, 101 T.C. 593; Blatt, 102 T.C. at 85 (Beghe, J., concurring).
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III. AFTERMATH OF THE DECISIONS
These conflicting decisions have opened the door to spouses looking
to escape taxation. Giving spouses control over who will recognize gain
on property can work only if they treat the transfer consistently. If one
spouse transfers appreciated property to the other, and does not recognize
gain pursuant to I.R.C. § 1041, the gain will be preserved only by a
carryover basis. This happens in transfers between spouses where no
third party is involved. When the property is transferred to a third party,
gain is recognized by the transferor.
Because inconsistent judicial decisions have extended § 1041
nonrecognition to certain property transfers to third parties, there is an
opportunity for spouses to treat property transfers inconsistently. This
occurs where one spouse, incident to the divorce property settlement,
first agrees to bear the tax burden on stock to be redeemed, and then
undergoes a change of mind, seeking nonrecognition under § 1041081 It is
difficult to expect spouses to treat a transfer of property consistently for
tax purposes when one who has agreed to bear the tax burden chooses
not to some months later.
A.

Frustrationof the Policy ofDeferral

The possibility of escaping taxation under this regime frustrates the
goal of § 1041: the deferral of gain recognition until property is
transferred to a third party. 2 Under § 1041, spouses are given control
over when and to whom the recognition of gain will fall. Deferred gain is
preserved by the carryover basis requirement of § 1041(b).83 This
consistency requirement of § 1041 effectuates the policy of deferral and
prevents the possibility of the whipsaw.
Nevertheless, the manner by which § 1041 has been applied to stock
redemptions incident to divorce has encouraged the whipsaw and the
very maneuvering it was enacted to prevent. The frustration of the policy
of deferral leads to two problems surrounding stock redemptions incident
to divorce: the inequitable division of assets and the possibility of the
whipsaw.

81. Ames v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 522,525 (1994).
82. See suprapart I.B.

83. i.R.C. § 1041(b) (1988).
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B. InequitableDivision ofAssets
Apportioning marital assets as equitably as possible at divorce usually
is desirable. To accomplish this, it is necessary to take the potential tax
burden of appreciated property into account at the time the marital
property is divided by the state court."
The confusion surrounding the taxation of stock redemptions incident
to divorce creates two problems in this area. First, it ray be difficult at
the time of the property settlement to predict which spouse will
recognize gain on the redemption of stock. This leads to expense and
inconvenience as many divorcing spouses must solicit private letter
rulings from the IRS to ensure a fair dissolution of property.
A second outcome arises when the expectations of the spouses are not
fulfilled. It may be the case that the state divorce court will divide
property on the understanding that one spouse will recognize the gain on
the redemption of stock.85 If these expectations are frustrated by the
courts' application of the "on behalf of" provision, an inequitable
division of marital assets may result.
Suppose that spouses A and B enter into divorce settlement
proceedings. The only asset of A and B is 100 shares of a closely held
corporation which they jointly owned, with a basis of 10 and a value of
100. Suppose further that an equitable division of the marital assets will
be achieved only by a fifty-fifty division, and it is agreed that A should
not remain as a shareholder. At first glance it may seem that dividing the
stock in half and redeeming A's shares would be fair. However, A would
dispose of fifty shares with a basis of five and a value of fifty, so there
would be a taxable gain of forty-five. On basic tax principles, the gain
would have to be recognized by someone.
If it is agreed that A should recognize the gain on Ihe redemption, it
will be necessary to give A more than fifty shares to effect a fifty-fifty
division of the assets to account for the tax payable. Suppose that A
initially pays tax on the gain, but some time later decides to sue for a
refund arguing that the redemption was a transfer of property "on behalf
of" B within the meaning of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c). If the
84. Roland Hjorth, The Effect of FederalTax Consequences on Amounts of Property Allocated to
Spouses in State CourtDissolution Proceedings, 24 Fam. L.Q. 247 (1990) Professor Hjorth notes
that state courts generally do not take inherent tax liabilities into account when structuring divorce
settlements. However, there are exceptions, including circumstances where the divorce decree itself
will require the sale of property with a tax burden. Id. at 252. That certainly would be the case where
a couple holds stock in a closely held corporation.
85. Id.
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court applies a test favorable to A, B may have to recognize the gain of
forty-five. The net result is a dissolution of the marital assets that gives A
more than fifty percent.
C. The Whipsaw
As evidenced by the Ames decisions, the possibility of the whipsaw
exists in stock redemptions incident to divorce. The conditions most
favorable to the whipsaw exist when the spouses' cases are not
consolidated, when the courts apply different tests to measure whether a
transfer is "on behalf of" the nontransferring spouse, and when a spouse
has changed his or her mind.86 While it appears that the decision in Blatt
v. Commissionerand private letter rulings have eliminated the possibility
of the whipsaw in these transactions, the Ames decisions still stand.
IV. THE IRS'S CURRENT POSITION
A.

Private LetterRulings

The IRS has attempted to reconcile the cases through private letter
rulings. 7 In two of these,88 the IRS applied the "on behalf of" language
of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-lT(c), Q & A 9 to Case 2 fact patterns.89
In both cases, the IRS ruled that I.R.C. § 1041 covered the transactions.
Two separate transfers of property were identified: (1) a stock transfer
from one spouse to the other, and (2) a transfer of stock to the third-party
corporation. The IRS respected the first as a § 1041 nonrecognition
transfer, but held that gain would be recognized on the second transfer by
the redeeming spouse. 9°
The IRS first analyzed the issue in these rulings by raising the steptransaction doctrine.9 The question was whether the stock redemption
should be respected as an independent transfer of property by a
86. See Ames v. United States, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992); Ames v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.
522 (1994).
87. IRS Holds Transferee Has Gain in Am es-Type Redemption, 81 J. Tax'n 261 (1994).
88. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-27-009 (July 8, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-46-004 (July 20, 1990).
89. See suprapart II.A. (Pursuant to a divorce decree, H transfers stock to W, Wredeems stock to
corporation).
90. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-27-009 (July 8, 1994).
91. See, e.g., McDonald's Restaurants v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
McDonald's is an example of the application of the step-transaction doctrine generally. It is not
directly an application of the doctrine to a stock redemption at divorce case, of which none have
been found by this author.
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stockholder, or recharacterized as a constructive redemption by the other
spouse, followed by a transfer of the proceeds. 92 There is no question that
spouses in a Case 1 transfer could accomplish the same outcome through
different means. The spouse originally owning the shares could cause
shares to be redeemed, and thereafter transfer the proceeds to the other
spouse. Such a situation is ordinarily a prime case for the application of
the step transaction doctrine.
Nevertheless, the IRS did not apply the step transaction doctrine,
citing § 1041. According to the IRS, § 1041 (and specifically Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c)) contemplated that the spouse who exercises
sufficient ownership over property transferred to a third party would
recognize gain.93 It found that the redeeming spouse exercised sufficient
ownership control in the agreement to redeem the shares immediately
after receiving them, thus causing the spouse who redeemed the shares to
recognize gain.94
The IRS position can be summarized from a review of the private
letter rulings and its arguments in the cases. Essentially, the policy of
§ 1041 is interpreted to be satisfied: (1) if the spouse who exercises the
control over the stock sufficient to cause it to be redeemed will recognize
gain (usually, the transferring spouse);95 and (2) the nontransferring
spouse will be taxed only where a primary and unconditional obligation
to buy the shares of the transferring spouse is discharged by the
corporation.9 6
It is unclear whether this position will continue to be applied through
letter ruling only, or if it will be reduced to regulation.97 The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has proposed
amendments to the regulations under § 1041 that would codify the IRS's
position." The AICPA proposal would add two examples to the
92. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-46-004 (July 20, 1990).
93. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-27-009 (July 8, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-46-004 (July 20, 1990).
94. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-27-009 (July 8, 1994). In the ruling, the IRS noted the fact that the
transferring spouse was not technically obligated by the divorce decree to redeem the shares..
95. Thus, the "on behalf of' language of the temporary regulation presumably would not apply to
individuals like Joann Ames. However, the IRS continues to distinguish A.rnes v. United States in
letter rulings. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-27-009 (July 8, 1994).
96. E.g., Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993).
97. Some have argued that the letter rulings are sufficient to settle the issue. See IRS Holds
TransfereeHas Gain in Ames-Type Redemption, 81 J. Tax'n 261 (1994).
98. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA Domestic Relations Task Force
ProposesRegulatory Changes (Part3, "ProposalforChanges to Temp. Treas. Reg. Section 1.1041IT(c), Q & A 9 - RegardingStock Redemptions Incident to Divorce'), 95 Tax Notes Today 61-30
(Mar. 29, 1995).
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temporary regulations under § 1041. The first proposed example is based
on Case 2 facts.99 It applies § 1041 nonrecognition to the division of
ownership of the stock, but not to the subsequent redemption by one
spouse.' ° Thus, the exercise of ownership in the form of the redemption
causes gain recognition. The second proposed example is based on Case
3 facts. 1' The discharge of a primary and unconditional obligation by the
corporation is considered a transfer "on behalf of" the continuing
shareholder. 2 Whether or not examples like those proposed by the
AICPA are adopted, it is reasonable to expect that the IRS will continue
to apply the principles embodied in them.
B.

What's Wrong with This Solution

The approach taken by the IRS is similar to the argument made by
Judge Beghe in Blatt v. Commissioner.'0 3 Although providing a greater
degree of uniformity in determining outcomes in the cases, this approach
is flawed in a number of ways. All of these are reducible to the
continuing frustration of the policy of deferral underlying § 1041.104
First, the IRS has improperly applied the "exercise of control"
standard to stock redemptions incident to divorce. It is disingenuous to
argue that a divorcing spouse exercises control over stock by providing
for its disposition before it is transferred from the other spouse. When a
couple's largest asset is closely held stock, it is often impossible for both
to remain as shareholders after divorce. In such situations it is necessary
to redeem some of the stock. This decision is made by both spouses, with
court approval or mandate. Further, the decision to redeem stock benefits
both spouses by accomplishing the division of marital property and
finalizing property claims.
Thus, the decision to redeem shares is made well before the spouse
who ends up redeeming the actual shares may ever own them, and the
decision is not made by that spouse alone. Instead, both spouses agree
99. See supra part ll.A. (Couple own stock jointly, divorce decree requires division of stock, and
the redemption of the stock by one spouse).
100. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, supranote 98.
101. See suprapart II.A. (Divorce decree awards all stock to one spouse, and requires that spouse
to pay the other. Thereafter, the stockholder causes the corporation to discharge that obligation).
102. See supranote 80 and accompanying text.
103. 102 T.C. 77, 85 (1994) (Beghe, J., concurring) ("[No redemption should be considered to be
'on behalf of' the remaining spouse unless it discharges that spouse's primary and unconditional
obligation to purchase the subject stock...
104. See suprapart III.A.
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that one should continue as a shareholder, and the other should receive
assets from the corporation.' The redemption itself is a mere step in the
process of equitably allocating marital claims. Under these
circumstances, it is difficult to accept the formal "ownership exercise"
reasoning proffered by the IRS in causing gain to be recognized by one
spouse.
Further, it remains theoretically possible for both spouses to recognize
gain under the approach taken by the IRS. So long as there is some
degree of overlap between the test of primary and unconditional
obligations and the exercise of ownership control test, this possibility
lingers. Suppose that a divorce decree awards all of the previously jointly
held stock of spouses A and B to B, and further requires B to pay A for
the value of A's interest in the stock. Suppose also that the corporation is
secondarily liable for the obligation. Thereafter, prior to B receiving sole
ownership of the stock, suppose B defaults on the obligation to A, and A
receives satisfaction of the obligation from the corporation. In this case,
the corporation has discharged a primary and unconditional obligation of
B. It may also be argued that A has exercised control over the one-half
interest in the shares by requiring the corporation to :pay for the stock,
transferred to B.
This outcome is possible where the spouses bring their claims in
different venues. 0 6 Consolidation of cases is preferable, but not always
possible, so long as people have freedom to brings claims where they
wish. Presumably, however, both spouses will not be taxed because the
IRS will allow nonrecognition to extend to one spouse, conditioned on
the recognition of gain by the other.0 7 However, even when the IRS has
provided for such a conditional outcome, as in Hayes, fae court has noted

105. It may appear that this is also true with more common "buy-sell" agreements. That is, when a
closely held corporation is formed, shareholders usually enter into agreements that require shares to
be redeemed under explicit circumstances (usually death or retirement o1 shareholders). In these
cases, the shareholders are together deciding before the fact when, and under what circumstances,
shares will be redeemed. Remaining shareholders benefit from these agreements by ensuring that
control will remain in the hands of a few, predetermined individuals. However, these buy-sell
agreements differ significantly from stock redemptions incident to divorce. Buy-sell agreements are
entered into on the expectation that the shareholders will continue as equity holders in the
corporation for a significant period of time. The triggering circumstances are distant. A divorcing
spouse, on the other hand, may have transitory "ownership" of the stock to effectuate the property
settlement. There is often no expectation of holding equity in the corporation beyond the limited
settlement purposes. Instead, the stock is a mere tool in the process of splitting up property. But see
Ames v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 522,538-41 (1994) (Beghe, J., concurring).
106. E.g.,Arnes, 102 T.C. at 530.
107. E.g., Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993).
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the overlap
of the two standards employed in the IRS's approach to the
8
I

cases. 1

Conversely, the possibility of the whipsaw has not been eliminated.
The IRS continues to distinguish Ames v. United States in its letter
rulings."0 9 The overlap of the primary and unconditional obligation test,
and the exercise of control test allow for the lingering presence of the
whipsaw. With a redeeming spouse in front of it, one court may find that
the remaining spouse had a primary and unconditional obligation
discharged by the corporation. With the remaining shareholder spouse in
front of it, another court may find that the obligation did not rise to this
level, but that the redeeming spouse exercised ownership control over the
stock.
So long as both spouses bring consolidated cases, and the IRS agrees
that only one should recognize gain, these problems disappear. However,
this will likely continue to be impossible. Even if it were possible, the
formal approach taken by the IRS continues to allow for the frustration
of the policy of deferral in other ways. Specifically, the problems of
changing minds' and the inequitable division of assets11 persist.
Although spouses together may decide that one of them will continue
as a shareholder and the other will receive corporate assets in exchange
for the shares, neither is given control over who will recognize gain from
the withdrawal of corporate assets." 2 Instead, gain recognition rests on
the formal determination of which spouse was the last in control of the
redeemed stock. This formal inquiry does not lessen the necessity for
spouses to receive letter ruling approval from the IRS, nor does it give
spouses reason to stop maneuvering against one another.
V.

PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENT

A.

Giving Spouses Control:A ClearConsistency Requirement

In place of the formal "exercise of ownership" inquiry, I.R.C.
§ 1041's policy of deferral should be carried through by giving the
spouses the freedom to choose who will be taxed. The best vehicle for

108. See supranote 76.
109. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-27-009 (July 8, 1994).
110. See supra partIlI.
S11. See suprapart HI.B.
112. This applies except to the extent that the spouses strictly comply with the formal
requirements as applied by the IRS.
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this freedom of choice is an amendment to I.R.C. § 302.' 1' Together with
I.R.C. §§ 316, 317, and 301, § 302 controls whether a stock redemption
will be taxed as an exchange of property or a shareholder dividend." 4
Amending § 302 would be preferable to amending § 1041. This would
keep the newly created "incident to divorce" standard in § 302 separate
from the one currently embodied in § 1041. Further, the language of an
amendment should refer internally to parts of § 302.
The amended code section"' would apply only to situations in which
the redemption of stock is required by a divorce decree, or other
agreement incident to divorce. 1 6 In such cases, the parties would be
obligated to file a letter with the IRS, signed by both spouses. The letter
would describe the contemplated redemption and state to which spouse
any tax consequences would attach. 7 Thereafter, the spouses would be
required to conduct themselves according to the terms of the letter.
The proposed amendment fits within the framework of § 1041 by
providing that where property is transferred to a third party, one spouse
will be taxed. In consolidated cases and letter rulings, the IRS has held
that only one spouse should recognize gain on the redemption of stock
incident to divorce."' Accordingly, it should not matter to the
government which spouse will recognize gain, as long as it is assured
that one, and only one, will." 9 In light of this, divorcing spouses should
be given the freedom to determine who will bear the tax burden at the
same time they both agree on who will remain as a shareholder and who
will receive corporate funds.

113. I.R.C. § 302 (1988).
114. "If a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning of § 317(b)), and if paragraph (1),
(2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be treated a; a distribution in part or
fill payment in exchange for the stock." I.R.C. § 302(a) (1988).
115. For the text of the proposed amendment, see infra note 135.
116. "Incident to divorce" is defined to include transfers of property related to the "cessation of
the marriage" or transfers within one year of divorce. LR.C. § 1041(c). The proposed amendment
would further limit the scope of "incident to divorce" by including only those redemptions required
by a divorce agreement See infra note 135.
117. See I.R.C. § 302(c) (1988) (requiring filing of letter by terminating shareholder that obligates
taxpayer to have no impermissible interest in corporation for term of years).
118. E.g., Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-27-009 (July 8, 1994).
119. The only difference could be the character of the gain. One spouse may receive capital gain
treatment under § 302, while the other may receive a taxable dividend. This difference has no impact
on the present argument, because under the IRS's current position, the redeeming spouse will almost
always recognize capital gain. See supra part IV. This is the case because he spouse who exercises
control of the stock being redeemed usually will be making a complete termination of his or her
interest and thus be entitled to capital gain treatment under I.R.C. § 302(a) by virtue of § 302(b)(3).
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B.

Advantages of the ProposedAmendment

Taxing stock redemptions incident to divorce in this manner would
have many advantages, among them: (1) giving effect to the policy of
deferral; (2) providing certainty to the spouses, and thereby eliminating
the inconvenience and expense of obtaining letter rulings; and (3)
bringing the recognition of gain at divorce into line with the realities of
marital property dissolution.
1.

Furtheringthe Policy ofDeferral

There is no chance of double taxation or whipsaw where divorcing
spouses are made to decide which of them will recognize gain in a
contemplated stock redemption. This is especially true if they are
required to inform the IRS of the decision. Presently, buoyed by
decisions permitting both spouses to escape taxation, 2 ' opportunistic
spouses who first expected to recognize gain are trying to transfer that
gain to their former spouses.'
The best way to foreclose the opportunities for escaping or
transferring taxation is to require spouses to decide up front who will be
taxed. Knowing that the letter filed with the IRS is binding, divorcing
spouses will not have any room to change their minds and whipsaw the
government. Thus, the deferral sought under § 1041 is ensured. Because
property is being transferred to a third party, one spouse is taxed; the
proposed amendment is a vehicle for the spouses to choose which one.
2.

Certainty

In light of the inconsistent judicial decisions, divorcing spouses
presently seeking absolutely certain tax treatment of a stock redemption
incident to divorce need to petition the IRS for a private letter ruling.
This is expensive and time-consuming. If the spouses are permitted to
decide for themselves who will be taxed, the need for letter rulings
would be eliminated. The certainty of this process would facilitate the
equitable division of marital assets at divorce" because the tax liability
could be clearly accounted for.

120. See Ames v. United States, 981 F.2d 456,457 (9th Cir. 1992).
121. See Blatt v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 77, 78 (1994).
122. See suprapart I.B.
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Accordancewith Reality ofDivorce

The IRS has based its holdings on the proposition. that a divorcing
spouse exercises ownership control by directing stock to be redeemed."
However, the realities of divorce call for different presuppositions. A
divorcing couple that owns stock in a closely held corporation usually
will not remain as co-shareholders. There may be a number of reasons
for this: a requirement by franchise agreement," the inability to get
along, or one's desire for cash instead of an equity interest in a
corporation. Regardless of the reasons, the decision to redeem some of
the stock is made by, and for the benefit of, both spouses.
In light of this, divorcing spouses should not be taxed on the
presumption that the last one to formally direct the disposition of the
stock really transferred it to the third party. The spouses decide that one
should remain as a shareholder, and the other should not. They decide to
use corporate assets, through a stock redemption, to compensate the
spouse who will not continue as a shareholder. The continuing
shareholder benefits by satisiying marital property claims, and by
gaining a greater control interest in the corporation."12 The noncontinuing
shareholder benefits by receiving cash or other property. Because the
spouses decide together to redeem stock, and because both benefit from
the decision, they should be allowed to decide who will be taxed on the
redemption.
C.

Scope of the ProposedAmendment

The proposed amendment would apply to cases where an agreement
incident to divorce contemplates the redemption of cloely held stock.' 26
Thus, the letter would be filed only when an agreement, formal or
informal, mandates a stock redemption to satisfy marital property rights.
There are two cases that are not covered by the scope of the proposed
amendment: (1) where a divorce instrument divides stock between
spouses, and where one of the spouses, not pursuant to any divorce
agreement, thereafter redeems stock; and (2) where one spouse has a
primary and unconditional obligation to transfer cash or property to the
other and causes the corporation to discharge that obligation. A third

123. See suprapart IV.A.
124. E.g.,Arnes, 981 F.2d at 457; Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593 (1993).
125. Alan L. Feld, Divorce and Redemption, 64 Tax Notes 651, 655 (1994).
126. See infra note 135.
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case, where the redemption is contemplated by a divorce agreement but
where the parties do not agree on who will recognize the gain and do not
file a letter with the IRS, needs to be addressed by the proposed
amendment.
1.

Independent Redemption

To satisfy marital property claims, a divorce property settlement may
divide jointly held stock, or it may require one spouse to transfer stock to
the other. It is entirely possible that both spouses will expect to continue
as shareholders. In such cases, no redemption will be contemplated at the
time of divorce. However, one of the former spouses may thereafter
redeem shares.
These cases are not covered by the proposed amendment because no
redemption is required by a divorce agreement. In this case, a
shareholder has caused stock to be redeemed, independent of any
agreement with the former spouse. This case also is outside the scope of
§ 1041 because it is not a transfer to a spouse or former spouse, nor "on
behalf of" a former spouse. Accordingly, the spouse who redeems the
shares should recognize gain.
2.

Dischargeof a Primaryand UnconditionalObligation

If a spouse discharges a primary and unconditional obligation to
transfer cash or property to a former spouse by using assets of a
corporation, the transfer is outside the scope of the proposed amendment.
This is because no redemption was required by a divorce agreement.
Rather, it is a transaction covered in Rev. Rul. 69-608.127 Thus, the
transfer of property from the corporation to the former spouse 1is28 a
constructive dividend to the spouse whose obligation was discharged.
This is treated as a deemed distribution by the corporation to the
shareholder spouse, who thereafter transfers the proceeds to the former
spouse incident to divorce. No gain is recognized by the former spouse
on this deemed transfer of the proceeds under § 1041.

127. Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42.
128. See Hayes, 101 T.C. at 599.
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Spouses FailTo Agree

If a divorce agreement contemplates the redemption of stock, but the
spouses fail to agree on who will be taxed, the old "on behalf of" inquiry
would seem to have to be invoked. However, it would be unacceptable to
provide certainty only for those who comply with the filing requirement,
while allowing others to continue under the regime that exists under
1 30 and the "exercise
Ames v. United States,'29 Blatt v. Commissioner,
of
3'
test.'
control"
Certainty, and elimination of the possibility of the whipsaw, should be
available not only where the spouses decide who will be taxed, but also
where they do not. However, because the spouses in -this case have not
taken advantage of their ability to choose, the choice must be made for
them. This imposed choice should reflect the realities of marital property
dissolution but should not be a burden on the IRS. It should account
for the special nature of using closely held stock to divide marital
property at divorce, 33 as well as the benefits that accrue to both spouses
34
from the use of corporate assets.
Taking these factors into account, the proposed amendment provides
for the default treatment of cases where a stock redemption is required by
a divorce agreement, but the spouses fail to agree as to who will
recognize the gain. Specifically, in these cases, the proposed amendment
provides for two deemed stock redemptions of one-half of the redeemed
stock. Each spouse would be treated as having received the proceeds of
one of the deemed stock redemptions.'3 5 Thus, if the spouses do not or
36
cannot agree, the gain from the redemption would be shared equally.

129. 981 F.2d 456 (1992).
130. 102 T.C. 77 (1994).
131. See supra part V.A.
132. This would be the case if the IRS was required to look into the facts of each case to
determine the most fair allocation of the tax burden upon accounting for the division of property.
This should remain the province of the state divorce court.
133. See supra part IV.B.
134. See supra text accompanying note 124.
135. The proposed amendment would read as follows:
(f) Stock Redemptions Incident To Divorce - This subsection shall apply to any redemption of
stock by a corporation to a shareholder, inoident to divorce.
(1) A redemption to which this subsection applies will be deemeD to be two separate
redemptions (one by each spouse or former spouse) of one-half of the shares of the redeemed
stock, unless an agreement is filed with the Secretary pursuant to subsection (f)(2).
(2) If, at least 10 days before stock is redeemed, incident to divorce,
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VI. CONCLUSION
Courts have been unable to consistently apply I.R.C. § 1041 and the
corresponding regulations to stock redemptions incident to divorce. The
resulting confusion and maneuvering room given to divorcing spouses
should be overcome by an amendment to § 302 of the Internal Revenue
Code. The amendment would provide divorcing spouses with the
freedom to choose which of them will be taxed when a divorce
agreement contemplates the stock redemption. This solution ensures that
gain will be recognized and provides certainty and flexibility to
divorcing spouses in planning for the equitable division of marital
property claims. The amendment would also provide for instances where
the spouses fail to decide who will be taxed by requiring the spouses to
bear the tax burden equally. This can be accomplished by creating
deemed redemptions of one-half of the stock by both spouses.

(A) both spouses agree as to which one of them will be treated as the shareholder who
redeems stock incident to divorce, and
(B) an agreement, signed by both spouses, that names which spouse will be treated as the
redeeming shareholder under subsection (f)(2)(A), is filed with the Secretary,
the spouse who agrees to be treated as the shareholder who redeems the shares, incident to
divorce, will be so treated.
(3) Incident to divorce - For the purposes of this subsection, a redemption of shares is
incident to divorce if a divorce decree or other agreement entered into by the divorcing spouses
requires that shares in a corporation be redeemed within one year of divorce.
136. This is the theoretical treatment of stock redemptions entertained by Professor Chirelstein
many years ago. Marvin Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the
Repurchaseof Common Shares,78 Yale L.J. 739 (1969).
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